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MEDICINE AND LAW: SELECTED RECENT 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Hillary G e e n e ,  Michael R. Ragan and M .  Stuart Madden 
The dynamic interaction of medicine and law continues to raise difficult, cutting- 
edge challenges for practitioners, scholars, and decision makers in both fields. The 
process of accommodating new medical problems, techniques, and solutions within 
the traditional doctrines and processes of the law involved many new or developing 
issues during the past year. This article will consider the state of the law, as reflected 
in recent decisions and legislation, in two particularly important medical-legal areas: 
AIDS and proof of causation. 
I. AIDS 
The legal community's success in fulfilling its role in the AIDS pandemic will depend 
upon its ability to deal with AIDS-related issues within the contours of the law and, 
when necessary, to recontour the law to accommodate those issues. The decision that 
follows will consider the developing legal reaction to AIDS as reflected in three key 
areas: tainted blood litigation, civil rights cases, and insurance law. 
A. Tainted BLood and Blood  product^ 
A tremendous amount of AIDS-related litigation involves tainted blood or blood 
products. In the seminal case in this area, Kozzlp v .  Georgetown University,' parents 
of an infant who contracted AIDS as a result of a blood transfusion unsuccessfully 
sued the blood bank that collected the blood and the hospital that administered the 
1 .  663 F .  Supp .  1048 (D.D.C. 1987), ajfd in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 851 F.2d 
437 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
Part I was authored by Hillaty Geene, a lecturer in English at the University of Miami, 
and Michael R. Ragan, an attorney with the Orlando, Florida, firm of Fisher, Rushmer, 
Wewenwrath, Keiner, Wack & Dickson, P.A. 
Part I I  o f  this article was authored by M. Stuart Madden, profssor of law at the Pace 
University School of Law. Profssor Madden wishes to acknowledge the assistance provided by 
David Klein in its preparation. 
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transfusion.' In Kozup the blood was donated in October 1982 and it was transferred 
in January 1983. The Kozup court predicated its evaluation of the defendants' liabil- 
ity upon the scientific and medical communities' understanding of AIDS in 1982, 
when the transfusion was administered. Like Kozup, nearly all published opinions in 
this area involve infection arising from blood producrs collected and utilized prior to 
1986. Hospitals, blood banks, and manufacturers have enjoyed a veritable immunity 
with respect to disease transmissions occurring in this early period.' 
The plaintiffs in Kozup alleged that the American Red Cross (ARC) had been 
negligent in its failing "(1) to screen donors that were members of high risk groups 
for AIDS; (2) to implement tests [hepatitis B core antibody test] that would have 
eliminated blood contaminated with AIDS; and (3) to warn plaintiffs of the danger- 
ous condition of the b10od."~ The plaintiffs also charged Georgetown with negligence 
in failing to inform them, prior to the transfusion, of "directed donation,"' the pro- 
cess whereby family and friends of a patient donate the blood to be used in the event 
the patient requires a transfusion. The district court, however, based on its medical 
chronology of research and information about AIDS, concluded that the understand- 
ing of AIDS transmissibility in 1982 did not warrant these precautions. The court 
identified 1984 as the rime when the medical community reached a consensus 
concerning the transmissibility of AIDS through blood and noted that the ELISA 
test, which screens for antibodies sensitive to HTLV-111, did not become available 
until May 1985." 
The plaintiffs in Kozup also sought relief "under the theory of strict liability in 
tort for an unreasonably dangerous product, under the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
402A . . . [and] for breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and 
fitness . . . under the Uniform Commercial Code."' In considering these theories, the 
district court observed that "the furnishing of blood is more in the nature of a service 
than of a sale of  good^."^ This characterization led the court to reject the plaintiffs' 
strict liability and implied warranty claims, which, as the court noted, were "rooted 
in the implied warranties of blood as a product and the ARC'S provision of blood 
to Georgetown as a sale of a product."' 
While this analysis could have disposed of the plaintiffs' strict liability and warranty 
claims, the district court went on to find blood to be an "unavoidably unsafe"-as 
opposed to unreasonably dangerous-product.'(' Inescapable medical limitations and 
public policy considerations inspired this conclusion. The court, relying heavily on 
2. Id. 
3.  Stevens, supra note 1, at 223-24. 
4.  663 F. Supp. at 1055-56. 
5 .  Id. at 1055. 
6. Id. at 1052. 
7 .  Id. at 1058. 
8 .  Id. at 1059. The court rejected plaintiffs claim under the District of Columbia Consumer 
Products Protection Act on similar grounds. The plaintiff unsuccessfully argued that the blood in ques- 
tion fell below the standard of quality expected, and, therefore, its distribution constituted an unfair 
trade practice. Id. at 1060. 
9 .  Id. at 1058-59. 
10. Id. at 1059 
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Fisher v.  Sibley Memorial Hospital," noted that strict liability would make suppliers 
of blood virtual insurers of that blood. Such liability would be particularly problem- 
atic given the imperfect ability of blood banks to screen out dangerous viruses.12 The 
district court also feared that the reluctance of hospitals and others to risk strict 
liability would impair the blood supply. To support its position, the court noted that 
nearly all states had enacted blood shield laws insulating blood suppliers from strict 
liability. I3 
Predicated upon a lack of informed consent theory, the plaintiffs in Kozup also 
alleged that the transfusion constituted a battery. The district court noted that this 
theory required the plaintiffs to "show there was a material risk associated with the 
treatment which, if disclosed, would have caused plaintiff to decline that course of 
treatment which resulted in plaintiffs injury."I4 In the court's view, however, the 
AIDS risk was not material when the decedent received his transfusions, as only one 
possible case of transfusion-related AIDS had been diagnosed at that tirne.l5 The 
court considered it unnecessary to address ARC'S liability for battery: As the physi- 
cians were not obligated to disclose the risk of AIDS to patients, no nondisclosure 
liability could be imposed on ARC. 
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment as to both defen- 
dants and on all counts, except the battery count against Georgetown.'"e court 
of appeals found summary judgment on that count inappropriate, as Georgetown 
had failed to receive any consent, informed or otherwise, for the blood transfusion. 
While the appellate court found summary judgment on the claim to be inappropriate, 
it specifically disavowed any implication that the plaintiffs were entitled to prevail 
on their battery theory. " 
Watson v. Medical Universityl~epresents the second wave of tainted blood liti- 
g a t i o n - - ~  in which precautionary measures actually existed but were not followed." 
Watson, which is currently pending, involves a March 1985 transfusion of blood 
donated in February 1985 to a premature baby who later developed AIDS and 
died."' While the ELISA test was not available in March 1985, it was understood 
that AIDS is transmissible through blood and that homosexuals constitute a high- 
1 1 .  403 A.2d 1130 (D.C. 1979). 
12. 663 F. Supp. 1058. 
13. id. at 1059 For-profit manufacturers of blood products, such as Factor IX concentrate taken 
by hemophiliacs, also are exempted from strict liability. Rogers v. Miles Labs., Inc., 802 P.2d 1346 
(Wash. 1991); see also Snyder v. Mekhjian, 582 A.2d 307, 313 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). 
14. 663 F. Supp. 1053. 
15. id. at 1054-55. 
16. Kozup v. Georgetown Univ., 851 F.2d 437, 440 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
17. id. at 440. 
18. C/A No. 88-2844-18 (D.S.C. Feb. 6,  1991). 
19. Stevens, supra note 1 ,  at 240-50. 
20. Watson, C/A No. 88-2844-18, slip op. at 1-2 (D.S.C. Feb. 6, 1991). 
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risk group. Watson alleged that the Red Cross negligently screened the donor of the 
blood in question." 
The Watson court has indicated that the plaintiff will have to prove that the Red 
Cross deviated from its procedures and that those procedures were consistent with 
the then standard of care among blood banks at that time." The nurses do not 
remember the donor in question, and the donor health history card does not illu- 
minate the alleged negligence. Because information from the donor about the Red 
Cross procedures will be crucial to the plaintiffs claim, the court has ordered discov- 
ery with appropriate protective measures.'.' The Watson court concluded that such 
discovery would not violate the donor's right to privacy or adversely impact the ability 
of suppliers to maintain a plentiful blood supply. To the extent such negative rami- 
fications might result, the court found them outweighed by the plaintiffs right to 
the desired inf~rmation. '~ 
As a result of the routine exclusion of high-risk donors and use of the ELISA test, 
tainted blood cases will become a steadily diminishing proportion of AIDS-related 
litigation. Nonetheless, Kozup and its progeny provide important precedent for future 
judicial evaluation of both governmental and private-sector responses to AIDS-related 
issues. The district court in Kozup, for example, exculpated the defendants largely 
because of the absence of any organization in the country that promoted or conducted 
itself in accordance with the precautions the plaintiffs advanced." The court did not 
normatively assess whether government or industry regulatory bodies should have 
recommended such precautions at the time.'~ndividuals have only limited ability 
to seek relief against governmental agencies and legislatures, due to sovereign immu- 
nity and considerable judicial deference, respectively, for their handling of the AIDS 
crisis." Subsequent judicial decisions, however, have suggested a more stringent eval- 
uation of private institutions than a mere comparison with the relevant community's 
standard of care: "If a given industry lags behind in adopting procedures that reason- 
2 1. A doctor at the university learned that the donor was an admitted homosexual who was incar- 
cerated. The court, which received this information from the doctor, noted that its order would be the 
same regardless of whether it considered the information. Id. at 4 n. 1. 
22. Id. at 7-8. 
23. Id. at 4-5. 
24. Id. at 13. In Rasmussen v. South Fla. Blood Sew., 500 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1987), the coun 
engaged in a similar evaluation of the competing interests but reached the opposite conclusion. In 
Rastnussen, however, the plaintiff sought names and addresses of blood donors with no restrictions on 
their use. Id. at 537. 
25. 663 F. Supp. at 1056. 
26. The court reiterated that soon after the first AIDS cases in June 1981, it became clear that the 
disease was particularly prevalent among homosexual males, intravenous drug users, and recently immi- 
grated Haitians. Id. at 105 1. The report from the July 1982 meeting of the Centers for Disease Control, 
National Institute of Health, Food and Drug Administration, American Association of Blood Banks, 
and National Gay Task Force stated that a "possible mode of transmissions is via blood products." Id. 
However, no recommendations resulted from this meeting. Id. Despite growing concern over the safety 
of the blood supply, when blood bank representatives met in January 1983, they did not recommend 
screening out homosexuals or the use of any laboratory tests. Id. at 1052. 
27. See, e.g.,  New York State Soc'y of Surgeons v. Axelrod, 555 N.Y.S.2d 91  1 (App. Div. 1990); 
see also In re Complex Blood Bank Litig., No. C 91-0007-MISC-RFP (N.D. Cal., Apr. 8. 1991). 
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able prudence would dictate be instituted, then we are free to hold a given defendant 
to a higher standard of care than that adopted by the indu~tty."~" 
One of the judiciary's most important roles in the medical-legal area is determining 
when sufficient knowledge of a certain procedure exists for the purpose of finding 
negligent those who do not perform that procedure. The most straightforward negli- 
gence actions will be based upon a failure to comply with established government 
regulations. Unfortunately, blood bank litigation to date has yielded only limited 
guidance for the assessment of liability during the transition period between growing 
appreciation of a particular risk and its formal recognition in government regulations. 
B. Civi l  Rights 
AIDS-related civil rights issues typically involve questions of privacy rights regarding 
HIV serostatus and discrimination based on actual or alleged HIV seropositivity. 
Public health considerations dominate judicial determinations of these issues. The 
courts recognize that, from a public health standpoint, it is best for HIV-infected 
individuals to know their status so that they can take appropriate measures to avoid 
transmitting the disease and to protect their own health. Legal protection of privacy 
rights and remedies for unlawful discrimination are essential to the promotion of 
these public health goals.29 Judicial assessment of the potentially competing interests 
has been most complicated in cases involving HIV-seropositive health care workers. 
Estate of Bebringer u. Medical Center at P ~ i n c e t o n ~ ~  involved a board-certified ENT 
surgeon and staff member at the Princeton Medical Center who learned, while a 
patient at the medical center, that he had both Pneumocystis Carinni Pneumonia 
(PCP) and AIDS. The surgeon, Behringer, received a bronchial washing to check for 
PCP, a conclusive indicator of AIDS, and a blood test screening for the HIV virus 
during a 1987 visit to the center's emergency room.31 Both tests yielded positive 
results. On the day after his release from the center, Behringer received numerous 
phone calls from hospital colleagues and from friends in the community who indi- 
cated knowledge of his diagnosis and expressed concern about his health. Shortly 
thereafter, Behringer's receptionist began to receive similar calls from patients and 
doctors, with many of the patients indicating that they no longer desired treatment 
from Behringer?* Upon learning of Behringer's condition, the president of the medi- 
cal center cancelled his pending surgical cases. Behringer never applied for reinstate- 
ment of his surgical  privilege^.^' Behringer's estate brought suit against the center 
and its president, seeking damages for breach of confidentiality of Behringer's diag- 
nosis and test results and for violation of state employment discrimination laws. 
The court intensely scrutinized the medical center's efforts to ensure the confiden- 
tiality of Behringer's records. Noting that "the privacy right on which the [physician- 
28. Hoemke v. New York Blood Ctr., 912 F.2d 550, 552 (2d Cir. 1990). 
29. Benjamin R .  v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 390 S.E.2d 814, 819 (W. Va. 1990). 
30. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991). 
31. Id. at 1255. 
32. Id. at 1256-57. 
33. Id. at 1257. 
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patient) privilege is based has been held to a level warranting constitutional protec- 
tion,"" the court found that the hospital had breached its duty to keep Behringer's 
medical records confidential by failing to implement special precautions against 
employee confidentiality breaches. The court criticized the notation of Behringer's 
HIV status and PCP diagnosis on his medical charts, which were accessible to nearly 
all medical center p e r ~ o n n e l . ~ ~  Given the hospital's practice of charting such results, 
controversial though it may be, the court suggested that access to HIV-positive patients' 
charts be restricted on a "bonafide need to know" basis and that hospital personnel 
be instructed on the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of patient records.36 
The court noted that while all patients, regardless of the nature of their illnesses, are 
entitled to proper maintenance of the physician-patient privilege, the confidentiality 
of an AIDS diagnosis is particularly important: 
The sensitive nature of medical information about AIDS makes a compelling argument 
for keeping this information confidential. Society's moral judgments about the high- 
risk activities associated with the disease, including sexual relations and drug use, make 
the information of the most personal kind. . . . The potential for harm in the event of 
a nonconsensual disclosure is substantial." 
The court cited numerous examples of "hysterical public reaction to AIDS" in support 
of this conclusion.'Vt went on, however, to observe that the confidential nature of 
Behringer's PCP diagnosis did not prevent disclosure to the New Jersey Department 
of Health in accordance with the hospital's statutory ~ b l i g a t i o n . ~ ~  
Behringer also sought damages for the revocation of his surgical privileges, which 
he alleged to violate state antidiscrimination laws.4" The court held that AIDS is a 
"handicap" under those laws, noting similar interpretations of legislation in other 
jurisdictions-both federal and state-prohibiting handicap di~crimination.~' The 
medical center's admission that it revoked Behringer's privileges based solely on his 
HIV status, therefore, established a prima facie case of discriminati~n.~~ 
The medical center's board of trustees had adopted a policy providing that "[a) 
physician or health care provider with known HIV seropositivity may continue to 
treat patients at The Medical Center at Princeton, but rhall not perform procedures 
that pose any risk of HIV transmission to the ~at ient ."~3 Additionally, the board 
required patients to sign a supplemental consent form, prior to undergoing operative 
34. Id. at 1268. 
35. Id. at 1272. 
36. Id. at 1273. 
37. Id. at 1272 (quoting Doe v. Barrington, 729 F. Supp. 376, 384 (D.N.J. 1990)). 
38. 591 A.2d at 1272 n.12. Many of the cited incidents involved employment discrimination: 
"removal of a teacher with AIDS from teaching duties; . . . refusal of co-workets of an AIDS victim to 
use a truck used by the victim; firing of homosexuals who displayed cold symptoms or rashes." Id. 
39. Id. at 1269. 
40. Behringer did not claim a breach of confidentiality for the disclosure of his condition to medical 
center personnel in change of monitoring surgical practices. Id. at 1275 n.15. 
41. Id. at 1275. 
42. Id. at 1276. 
43. Id. at 1260. 
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or invasive procedures by an HIV-seropositive health care worker, that acknowledged 
awareness of their doctor's HIV-positive status and of the possible risk of transmis- 
sion."" The board also had mandated that "[tlhe Medical Center at Princeton Medical 
and Dental Staff shall continue to care for patients with AIDS without 
dis~rimination."~~ 
The court provided an extensive account of the debate among staff members at 
the medical center as well as the parties' experts concerning the risk of HIV trans- 
mission from health care worker to patient. Dr. Selwyn, the plaintiffs expert, argued 
that the risk of HIV transmission from surgeon to patient was "virtually non-existent 
stati~tically."~"he risk was so "remote," argued Selwyn, that restrictions on plain- 
tiff s privileges and specific pretreatment disclosure of his health status were unwar- 
ranted."' This position was widely accepted at the time Behringer learned of his HIV 
status." Dr. Day, the defense expert, disagreed, however, with respect to both the 
likelihood of HIV transmission and the need for informed consent. Day argued that 
surgeons and their assistants "incur needle sticks and other cuts in the operating room 
on a regular basis" and that these occurrences provide opportunities for transmission 
of the disease."Way accordingly supported the center's policy. 
The court sustained the center's policy, concluding that the defense had established 
"with a reasonable degree of certainty . . . that the employee's handicap presented a 
materially enhanced risk of substantial harm in the workplace.""' The court gleaned 
from the fierce debate over the risk of HIV transmission from health care worker to 
patient that a "small," though unquantified, risk exists." Giving its extremely risk- 
averse assessment, the court was not compelled to quantiQ the risk more precisely": 
"Where the ultimate harm is death, even the presence of a low risk of transmission 
justifies the adoption of a policy which precludes invasive procedures when there is 
'any' risk of transmi~sion."~~ The court considered the fear of transmission, in addi- 
tion to the actual risk of transmission, to be relevant to its assessment. For example, 
the patient would have to be informed in the event of an accident that resulted in 
possible patient exposure to the health care worker's blood." Such a patient would 
then be subjected to a year of periodic HIV testing and endure tremendous anxiety 
regardless of whether an infection actually oc~urred.~' 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 1259. 
46. Id. at 1277. 
47. Id. at 1264. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 1265. 
50. Id. at 1276. 
5 1 .  Id. at 1280. 
52. The court did not consider dispositive the absence of any recorded cases of such transmission. 
Id. at 1267. CDC investigations have revealed that "a cluster of HIV infections among patients in the 
practice of one dentist with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome strongly suggests that HIV infection 
was transmitted to five of the approximately 850 patients evaluated through June 1991." 4 0  MORBID- 
ITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY Rep. 3 (199 1). 
53. 592 A.2d at 1283. 
54. Id. at 1265. 
55. Id. at 1266. 
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The court acknowledged that pse of an informed consent form might appear 
unnecessary in light of the strict prohibition on procedures that pose "any risk" of 
transmission of the HIV virus from health care worker to pacient.>"n its view, 
however, the "ultimate arbiter should be a fully informed patient."" The court 
recognized that an informed consent form could effect a de facto prohibition on all 
invasive procedures by HIV-seropositive health care  worker^.^" 
The Princeton medical center learned of Behringer's HIV serosracus through chance. 
If, as the court concluded in E~tate  of Bebringer, a health care worker's HIV serostatus 
is a material consideration for patients, to what extent may hospitals implement 
mandatory testing procedures? Leckelt v.  Board of  commissioner^'^ involved a licensed 
practical nurse who was dismissed for refusing to submit HIV test results to the 
Terrebone General Medical Center (TGMC). Leckelt was homosexual and was the 
roommate of a patient who eventually died of AIDS-related complications."Wpon 
considering these risk factors, TGMC, which had a preexisting policy requiring 
employees to report any communicable and infectious diseases, concluded that it 
needed to know Leckelt's HIV serostatus in order to ensure compliance with CDC 
guidelines.'" The Fifth Circuit rejected Leckelt's civil rights challenge to TGMC's 
requirement that he be tested, however, holding that "a hospital has a right to require 
such testing [of an employee whom it learns has a high medical risk of such infectious 
diseases as HIV] in order to fulfill its obligation to its employees and to the public 
concerning infection control and health and safety in general.''62 
Leckelt's primary claim involved Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
The court found'that he had failed to prove any of the elements of a claim under 
that statute: "(1) that he was regarded as being handicapped; (2) rhat he was discrim- 
inated against solely because of this perceived handicap; and (3) that he is otherwise 
qualified as a licensed practical nurse."" With respect to the first element, the court 
recognized that Leckelt had to establish only that he was "regarded as having . . . 
an impairment,"" but concluded rhat it was not clear whether AIDS constituted 
such an impairment or even whether the hospital officials regarded Leckelt as 
impaired." As to the second element, the court determined that the hospital had 
fired Leckelt because of his refusal to comply with hospital infection control policies, 
56. Id. at 1277. 
57. Id. at 1283. 
58. Id. at 1280. 
59. 909 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1990). 
60. Id. at 823. 
6 1 .  Id. at 826. 
62. Id. at 824 (quoting Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs, 714 F. Supp. 1377, 1379 (E.D. La. 1989)). 
63. Id. at 825. 
64. Id. (emphasis added). 
65. Id. In Chalk v. United States Dist. Ct., 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988). the Ninth Circuit 
noted that the lower court had found an HIV-seropositive individual to be "handicapped" within the 
meaning of Section 504, but did not consider the question, as it was not challenged on appeal. Id. at 
705 n.6. 
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not because of his alleged HIV serop~sitivity.~~ Lastly, the court found that Leckelt's 
refusal to submit HIV test results made it impossible to evaluate whether he was 
"otherwise qualified" for his nursing position.67 
Leckelt also claimed that TGMC had violated his Fourteenth Amendment guar- 
antee of equal protection. The court held, however, that governmental classifications 
based on disability are not "quasi-suspect" and, therefore, do not warrant heightened 
judicial s c r ~ t i n ~ . ~ W o r e o v e r ,  TGMC had "a substantial and compelling interest in 
its infection control policies which applied to any infectious or communicable disease. "69 
The court found equally unpersuasive k k e l t ' s  contention that the defendants violated 
his right to privacy under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, which "prohibit 
unreasonable searches and seizures."70 The court held that TGMC's interest in infec- 
tion control "outweighed the limited intrusion on any privacy interest of Leckelt in 
the results of his HIV antibody test."7' 
Employment practices have proven vulnerable to civil rights abuse based on actual 
or alleged HIV seropositivity. The Americans with Disabilities Act, which becomes 
effective in July 1992, will be read to include actual or alleged HIV seropositivity 
as a handicap.72 This act censures "hysterical" reactions to HIV-infected coworkers. 
Unless additional vectors of infection are discovered, health care providers will remain 
the most heavily regulated segment of the work force with respect to participation 
of HIV-infected  individual^.^^ 
The broad provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act do not apply to insurance 
or to the actuarially based underwriting of benefits. Nonetheless, Congress has 
cautioned insurers that they will not be allowed to engage in practices that "evade 
the purposes" of the act.74 To what extent, then, may insurers select insureds and 
66. Id. at 826. Leckelt lost his challenge under the Louisiana Civil Rights for Handicapped Persons 
Act on the same ground. Id. at 8 3  1. 
67. Id. at 827. 
68. Id. at 83 1. 
69. Id. at 832. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 833. 
72. 42 U.S.C.A. 5 12112 (West Pamph. 1991); see also H.R. REP. NO. 485(II), IOlst Cong., 
2nd Sess. 51 (1990). reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 333. 
73. On the issue of informed consent, Senators Jesse Helms and Strom Thurmond have offered an 
amendment to a bill in Congress that would impose a maximum $10,000 fine and minimum ten-year 
prison term, or both, on health care workers who are HIV-seropositive and do  not inform their patients. 
See 137 CONG. REC. S9778 (daily ed. July 1 I ,  1991). With respect to prohibitions against performing 
certain procedures, the CDC now recommends that HIV-seropositive health care workers refrain from 
"exposure-prone" activities unless they have received counsel from "an expert review panel and [have] 
been advised under what circumstances, if any, they may continue to perform these procedures.'' 40 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY Rep. 5 (1991). "Exposure-prone" activities include "digital palpa- 
tion of the needle tip in a body cavity or the simultaneous presence of the health care worker's fingers 
and a needle or other sharp instrument or object in a poorly visualized or highly confined anatomic 
site." Id. 
74. 42 U.S.C.A. $ 12201(c) (West Pamph. 1991); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), lOlst 
Cong., 2nd Sess. 70-71 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 493-94. 
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shape benefit plans based on HIV-related considerations? Generally, insurers have 
continued to make many of the assessments inherent in their business, including those 
with important ramifications for HIV-seropositive individuals, based on established 
insurance principles. These include the selection of candidates for health insurance, 
the voiding of life insurance policies for material misrepresentations, the application 
of intentional act exclusions, and the determination of worker's compensation benefits. 
One of the most important and controversial methods through which the health 
insurance industry has adjusted to the AIDS crisis is the evaluation of a potential 
insured's HIV status when determining insurability. In Health Insurance Association 
of  Atnericu v. Cor~oran,~' for example, the New York superintendent of insurance 
prohibited insurers selling individual and small group health insurance from consid- 
ering the HIV serostatus of potential applicants7G based upon the commissioner of 
health's determination that such tests were "contrary to the health care needs of the 
Insurers challenged the regulation, which essentially "mandat{ed] coverage 
for HIV seropositive persons in the general risk pool of applicants for individual and 
small group health policies. "7"n sustaining the insurers' challenge the court described 
HIV testing as "nondiscriminatory" and as a "sound underwriting practice" given 
the link between HIV seropositivity and AIDS.79 However, the court did not provide 
a blanket endorsement of HIV testing of health insurance applicants. The court 
specifically noted that HIV testing of applicants in connection with large group insur- 
ance policies is of less-certain validity, as insurers issuing such policies are assessing 
risks characteristic of a group rather than a particular individ~al.~' 
Insurers also are particularly concerned with HIV serostatus when issuing life insur- 
ance policies. As with any other serious health condition, misrepresentations concern- 
ing HIV status generally will render a life insurance policy void. In William Penn 
Life Insurance Co. v.  sand^,^' for example, two men took out life insurance policies 
naming each other as primary beneficiary. Each denied having either cancer or a blood 
disorder during the application process. Eight months later one of the men died as 
a result of AIDS and the other tested HIV-positive. Penn sought to rescind both 
policies.8z At trial, a doctor testified that both men were HIV-positive and had 
inflammatory Kaposi's Sarcoma, a type of cancer, when they applied for the policies. 
The court noted that misrepresentation will void a life policy "if the insurer in good 
faith would either not have issued the policy or . . . would not have issued it {or the 
same terms] if the facts had been known to the insurer as required by the application 
for the policy or o the~wise . "~~  Moreover, the court held it unnecessary for the appli- 
75. 551 N.Y.S.2d 615 (App. Div.) affd, 565 N.E.2d 1264 (N.Y. 1990); see also Life Ins. Ass'n 
v. Commissioner of Ins., 530 N.E.2d 168 (Mass. 1988). 
76. 551 N.Y.S.2d at 616. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 618. 
79. Id. at 619. 
80. Id. 
81. 912 F.2d 1359 (11th Cir. 1990). 
82. Id. at 1361. 
83. Id. 
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cant to know a statement is inaccurate for policy rescission based on material misrep- 
resentation. In the application at issue, however, the applicants represented that the 
information given was correct "to the best of my [their] knowledge and belief."84 In 
light of this emphasis on the applicants' awareness of their illness rather than the 
objective facts, the court required Penn to prove that the men had knowingly misrep- 
resented their health in order to deny c o ~ e r a g e . ~ ~  
Other insurers focus upon the circumstances under which the HIV virus was trans- 
mitted. Determination of coverage for the transmission of the HIV virus during 
consensual sexual activity likely will parallel that of other sexually transmitted diseases.86 
In Allstate insurance Company v.  H ~ l t , ~ '  Holt infected another person with herpes 
by engaging in sexual activity at a time when he knew that he had active lesions on 
his mouth. Holt's homeowner's policy contained an "intentional acts" exclusion, 
which precluded coverage for damages that "may reasonably be expected to result 
from the intentional or criminal acts of an insured person."88 The court found that 
Holt's sexual activity with active lesions could reasonably have been expected, under 
an "objective standard of expectation," to result in transmission of the disease.s9 
Unpersuaded that Holt's conduct was unintentional because it was the result of 
"seemingly uncontrollable" lust, the court sustained Allstate's denial of coverage.9o 
Workers' compensation claims by health care workers allegedly infected with the 
HIV virus in the course of their employment will arise under both accident and 
occupational disease the~r ies .~ '  In Jackson Township Volunteer Fire Co. v. work men'^ 
Compensation Appeal Board,92 a volunteer fire company was required to pay for the 
blood tests and shots required for a volunteer who was exposed to the HIV and 
HBV viruses while responding to an auto accident.93 Presumably, workers' compen- 
sation benefits will cover subsequent bills if the volunteer becomes seropositive and 
other vectors of infection are excluded. 
Application of the "occupational disease" theory to HIV infection is marked by 
considerable debate. In Wuesthoff Memorial Hospital v.  Hurlbert,9* a phlebotomist 
contracted hepatitis B several months after a dog bite punctured his thumbnail and 
the skin under it. He could not identify a specific incident exposing his wound to 
HIV-infected blood.'> However, because no other potential vectors of infection could 
84. Id. at 1362. 
85. Id. at 1365. 
86. Dalton. supra note 2. at 258. 
87. No. 90-1473 (E.D. Mich., Apt. 25, 1991). 
88. Id., slip op. at 3. 
89. Id. at 4. 
90. Id. at 5. The court noted that Holt, who was married at the time he infected the third person 
with herpes, had committed the felony of adultery under state law, indicating a potential absence of 
coverage under the policy's criminal acts exclusion. Id. at 3. 
91. See generally Brennan, Enruring Adequate Health Care fir the Sick: The Challenge of Acquired 
immunodeficiency Syndrome as an Occupational Disease, in AIDS Two: AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE 224- 
-7 (J. Vculek ed., 1989). 
92. 1991 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 371 (June 28, 1991). 
93. Id. at * l .  
94. 548 So. 2d 771 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
95. Id. at 774. 
Heinonline - -  2 7  Tort & Ins. L.J. 3 5 9  1 9 9 1 - 1 9 9 2  
360 Tort & Insurance Law Journal, Volume XXVII, Number 2, Winter 1992 
be identified, the health services supervisor concluded that "the lab was the most 
logical place for him to have contracted the virus."96 In determining the phleboto- 
mist's entitlement to "occupational disease" compensation the court considered whether 
the disease had "resulted from the nature of the employment . . . and was actually 
contracted while so engaged."97 The court determined that the elements of the "occu- 
pational disease" theory had been met and, as a result, considered proof of a specific 
incident of exposure to be unneces~ary.~"e court accordingly held chat the injury 
was compensable under workers' compen~ation.~' 
In contrast, in Sperling u. Industrial Commission,'" an operating room nurse who 
contracted hepatitis B was denied workers' compensation benefits. She claimed that 
she frequently cut herself with bloody operating instruments, but she could not describe 
any specific incident."" The court deferred to the commission's determination that 
she had failed to establish the requisite connection between her occupation and her 
hepatitis B infecti~n."'~ Interestingly, the Sperling court cited Sacred Heart Medical 
Center v.  Department of Labor'') in support of its deference to the administrative 
agency's finding of fact. The agencies in Sperling and Sacred Heart, however, reached 
different conclusions in evaluating very similar facts.lM It thus remains unclear to 
what extent a claimant must show a causal connection between work conditions and 
contraction of an "occupational disease." Though proof of direct causation is unnec- 
essary, the amount of evidence required seems to vary from agency to agency. 
Basic insurance law principles generally reflect public policy considerations. Insur- 
ance practices will be challenged when, due to the unique nature of AIDS, an actual 
or perceived conflict with public health policies arises. In such situations, legislatures 
may need to intervene and compromise the autonomy of insurers in the interest of 
other social policies. lo' 
11. MEDICAL-LEGAL PROOF OF CAUSATION 
Proof of causation in personal injury cases frequently involves vigorous medical-legal 
disputes over whether the defendant's product or process caused-or even could 
cause-the plaintiffs injury. These disputes raise difficult legal issues concerning the 
necessity of expert evidence, the qualification of experts testifying on the issue of 
proximate cause, the basis for and sufficiency of their opinions, and the quality of 
expert evidence necessary for a plaintiff to avoid summary disposition. 
96. Id. at 772. 
97. Id. at 773. 
98. Id. at 774-75. 
99. Id. at 771. 
100. 544 N.E.2d 290 (111. 1989). 
101. Id. at 291. 
102. Id. at 292. 
103. 600 P.2d 1015 (Wash. 1979). 
104. 544 N.E.2d at 293. 
105. See Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v.  Corcoran, 551 N.Y.S.2d at 618; see also Dalton, supra note 
2, at 185. 
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A. Burden of Proof and Necessity of Expert Medical Opinion 
When a plaintiffs claimed injury is one of medical harm or disease, his or her proof 
on the issue of proximate cause may require expert testimony. lob Such testimony, 
which "must be stated in terms of reasonable pr~bability,"'~' receives particular scru- 
tiny in toxic tort casesIo8 because the issue of causation rypically is largely, or even 
exclusively, the province of expert opinion in such cases.lo9 
To raise a triable issue of proximate cause, the toxic tort plaintiff must present 
"direct or circumstantial evidence of at least one exposure to defendant's prod~cts .""~ 
In asbestos cases, for example, most courts have required proof "that an injured 
plaintiff was exposed to a particular defendant's asbestos-containing product." I A 
plaintiff will not make a prima facie showing of injurious exposure merely by showing 
that a toxin was delivered to or present in a workplace or other environment where 
he or she was present.Il2 Plaintiffs in cumulative-impact toxin injury cases generally 
also are required to show the level and duration of exposure to the toxin through 
expert medical or scientific testimony.'I3 Some courts have concluded that a toxic 
tort claimant's own testimony that he or she was exposed to the defendant's toxin 
will not create a triable issue of the level or duration of exposure absent at least some 
medical or other expert confirmation of exposure.Il4 
Proximate cause ordinarily is an issue for jury determination, although a court may 
grant summary disposition for the defendant when "plaintiffs evidence does not 
establish a causal connection, leaving causation to the jury's speculation. . . ."!I5 When 
the plaintiffs injury or disease is of a nature that could have been caused by exposure 
to toxins or conditions not associated with the defendant's product or conduct, he or 
she must produce expert evidence "isolating other potential 
In several cases in which pretrial deposition testimony by an expert fell short of 
establishing a question of fact on the issue of proximate cause, coum have rejected 
attempts by parties to avoid summary judgment by presenting an affidavit in which 
the same expert states his or her conclusions in stronger terms."' Most coum have 
106. E.g., Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 916 F.2d 970  (4th Cir. 1990). 
107. E.g., id.; Niklaus v. Vivadent, Inc., 1991 WL 127182 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Longmore v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 11 17 (D. Idaho 1990). 
108. E.g., Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Kan. 1990); Turpin v. MerreU 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Ky. 1990). 
109. Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 646 F. Supp. 1420 (E.D. Tex. 1986), a f d ,  826 F.2d 420 (5th 
Cir. 1987). 
110. Benshoof v. National Gypsum Co., 761 F. Supp. 677 (D. Ariz. 1991). 
111. Id. 
112. Id.; see also Hyde v.  Owms-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 751 F. Supp. 832 (D. Ariz. 1990). 
113. E.g., Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp, 543 A.2d 975 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988), rev'd 
576 A.2d 4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). 
114. Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co.. 737 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Kan. 1990); see also Celotex Corp. 
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Davis v. DuPont, 729 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Ark. 1989). 
115. Benshoof v. National Gypsum Co., 761 F. Supp. 677 (D. Ariz. 1991) (quoting Robertson v. 
Six Pence Inns of Am., Inc., 789 P.2d 1040 (Ariz. 1990)). 
116. E.g., Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Kan. 1990). 
117. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 
Heinonline - -  27 Tort & Ins. L.J. 361 1991-1992 
362 Tort & Insurance Law Journal, Volume XXVII, Number 2, Winter 1992 
concluded that the only fact question raised by such tardy initiatives "is to determine 
which of the two conflicting versions of the . . . . testimony is correct.""" 
B. Federal Rules o f  Evidence 702 and 703 
A trial court's assessment of the admissibility of expert testimony requires the appli- 
cation of Federal Rules 702 and 703 or their state-law counterparts. Under Rule 
702, a court may reject expert testimony on causation issues if the witness is "unqual- 
ified to give expert testimony in the relevant field" or the expert, regardless of qual- 
ifications, has relied upon "an unreliable scientific te~hnique.""~ Rule 703 requires 
that the bases of an expert opinion be of "a type reasonably relied upon by experts 
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject."lzO The 
issues raised by challenges to expert testimony under rules 702 and 703 converge 
when the party opposing admission of an expert's testimony argues both that the 
"scientific technique" employed is unreliable and that the basis of the opinion is not 
of a type relied upon by others in that field of expertise. As one court has acknowl- 
edged, it may be unclear whether "expert testimony depends on a reliable 'scientific 
technique,' to be analyzed under Rule 702, or whether the basis for the testimony 
is 'facts or data . . . of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular 
field,' to be analyzed under Rule 703."121 
Rule 702's requirement that expert testimony be "helpful" to the factfinder "turns 
on whether the expert's 'technique or principle [is] sufficiently reliable so that it will 
aid the jury in reaching accurate results.' The court in In re Paoli Railroad Yard 
PCB Litigation,12' while agreeing that "helpfulness" imports "a quantum of relia- 
bility beyond that required to meet a standard of bare logical relevance,"lz4 reversed 
the trial court's Rule 702 "reliability" rejection of the plaintiffs expert "meta-anal- 
ys i~ . ""~  Unfortunately, the Paoli court expressly declined "to define the exact level 
at which a district court can exclude a technique as insufficiencly reliable." 
C.  Sufficiency of Expert Testimony 
Even multiple expert opinions supporting a plaintiffs theory of causation will be 
found inadequate as a matter of law if the experts fail to conclude that there exists 
a resonable probability that the toxin caused the injury. Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labo- 
118. Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984); accord Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labs., 
Inc., 916 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). 
119. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990). For purposes of Rule 702, a 
technique is considered "novel"-as opposed to "unreliable"-when its reliability is not so well estab- 
lished as to warrant recognition by judicial notice. Id. 
120. Fed. R. Evid. 703. 
12 1. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig.. 916 F.2d 8 2 9  (3d Cir. 1990). The Paoli court acknowledged 
that the distinctions berween the inquiries required under each rule are "oftimes subtle if not strained." 
Id. 
122. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 91 1 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting 3 J. 
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 702[03], at 702-35 (1988). 
123. 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990). 
124. Id. at 857. 
125. Id. at 858. 
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ratories, I ~ C . , ' ~ ~  a Dm case, illustrates this point. One expert for the plaintiffs in 
Rohrbough testified that he would not rule out the causal contribution of the vaccine; 
a second stated that the child's seizures could have resulted from the vaccination or 
from an ear infection and fever; and a third established a temporal link between 
administration of the vaccination and reactions, similar to that of the plaintiffs child, 
in other children. Affirming a summary judgment for the vaccine's manufacturer, 
the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs "ha[df not met their burden of coming 
forward with enough evidence that a jury could find that defendant's vaccine prob- 
ably caused plaintiffs injurie~."'~' 
D. Epidemiological Evidence of Causation 
Plaintiffs lacking direct evidence of causation frequently rely upon epidemiological 
proof. Epidemiology, a hybrid of science and medicine, "uses studies to 'observe the 
effect of exposure to a single factor upon the incidence of disease in two otherwise 
identical populations.' " Iz8  Epidemiological evidence tending to support--or r e f u t e  
plaintiffs claim of proximate cause has been held admissible in suits claiming injury 
from products ranging from asbestos to intrauterine devices.'29 
Many courts have permitted nonmedical expem to testify regarding epidemiolog- 
ical evidence of c a u ~ a t i o n . ' ~ ~  Some authority suggests, however, that a plaintiff who 
resorts exclusively to epidemiological proof may fail if his or her expert is qualified 
to address "the incidence of disease over large population groups" but not whether 
the defendant's product "was the causative agent" in the harm suffered by a partic- 
ular individual. I 3 l  
In situations in which a majority of epidemiological studies tend to disprove 
the plaintiffs claim that a particular product more probably than not caused a medi- 
cal injury, some courts have held that an expert's opinion to the contrary is exdudable 
as having inadequate f o u n d a t i ~ n . ' ~ ~  Significantly, however, in some cases involving 
the teratogeniciry of a pharmaceutical, expert opinion that the defendant's product 
more probably than not caused the injury has been held admissible even though most 
judicial decisions on similar facts and the majority of the expert community have 
concluded otherwise. For example, in DeLuca v. Memll-Dou, Pharmaceuticals, In~ . , l3~  
the Third Circuit reversed a trial court's refusal to allow the plaintiffs expert to 
testify that the morning sickness drug Bendectin was the proximate cause of her 
child's birth defects, even though the expert's opinion and his interpretation of the 
126. 916 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). 
127. Id. at 976. 
128. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 91 1 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Black 
& Liienfeld, Epidemiological Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 732 (1984)). See 
generally Callahan, Ertablishment of Cauration in Tort Litigation, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 604 (1991). 
129. Marder v. G.D. Searle & Co., 630 F. Supp. 1087 (D. Md. 1986) (intrauterine device); In re 
Agent Orange Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (Agmt Orange), af'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d 
Cir. 1987); Landrigen v.  Celotex Corp., 579 A.2d 1268 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (asbestos). 
130. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990). 
131. Id. 
132. E.g., Ealy v. Richardson-Merrell. Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
133. 91 1 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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epidemiological basis for it were controverted by the weight of scientific opinion and 
rejected by most courts considering similar claims.l3" 
There is agreement that tort claimants need not establish the scientific standard 
of proximate cause-the existence of a 95 percent level of confidence "that the observed 
relationship is not related to random ~hance"~j '  or, stated otherwise, a "statistically 
significant" relationship between the alleged cause and result.'j6 In general, courts 
have held that a plaintiff need not present epidemiological evidence conveying a 
statistically significant confidence level that the defendant's product caused the injury. 13' 
A growing body of authority suggests instead that a plaintiff makes a prima facie 
showing that exposure to a defendant's product or process more probably than not 
caused the injury in question by introducing epidemiological evidence that a person 
so exposed is twice as likely to be afflicted with the disease or medical injury than a 
person not so exposed.13* 
Even if the defendant's product or process is conceded to produce elevated risk 
factors in exposed populations, a plaintiff relying on epidemiological evidence may 
have difficulty proving that the defendant more likely than not caused his or her 
own injury. This dilemma is aptly described in Judge Weinstein's observation in In 
re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation1J9 that "even if plaintiffs as a class 
could prove that they were injured by Agent Orange," for any individual claimant 
"Etlhe probability of specific cause would necessarily be less than 5 0 % . " I 4 O  
Most courts still hold that plaintiffs who are unable to demonstrate a risk elevation 
equal to or exceeding 2.0 fail to establish proximate cause absent specific proof of 
individual causation. Some courts, however, have held that the absence of a demon- 
strated risk factor of 2.0 or more does not preclude plaintiffs expert testimony on 
the issue of proximate cause, even if the expert relies substantially on epidemiological 
studies, at least when the studies themselves are offered only as a basis for the expert's 
opinion and not as direct evidence of causation.I4' 
E. In Vitro, In Vivo, and Other Studies 
While epidemiological studies have gained measured acceptance in court as bases for 
expert opinions, the court in In re Bendectin Produrt~ Liability Li t igat i~n '"~ cautioned 
that "division in the scientific community over whether epidemiological studies should 
be relied upon exclusively necessitates the inescapable conclusion that experts may 
reasonably rely upon other types of data when forming an opinion as 
to . . . terat~genicity."'~~ 
134. Id. at 953. 
135. Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Idaho 1990). 
136. See DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990). 
137. Longmore v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 1 1  17 (D. Idaho 1990). 
138. E.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 758 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); we also 
Cook v. United States, 545 F. Supp. 306 (N.D.  Cal. 1982). 
139. 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
140. Id. at 833-34. 
141. Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 591 A.2d 671 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
142. 732 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Mich. 1990). 
143. Id. at 749. 
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Courts remain divided as to the foundational value of nonepidemiological studies, 
such as in uiuo, in  uitro, or structure activity analysis. The court in one Bendectin 
case found that plaintiffs proposal to prove the teratogencity of Bendectin "through 
the presentation o f .  . . studies using in  uitro testing, structure activity analysis, sales 
chart analysis, and animal studies" sufficient to defeat the defendant's motion for 
summary In other cases, however, courts have found extrapolations from 
in uiuo and in  uitro animal studies to be inadequate as an expert's basis for an opinion 
on causation. 14' 
F .  Significance of Publication and  Peer Review 
When an expert's testimony is based on his or her own writing or other analysis, 
trial courts continue to ascribe weight to the presence or absence of prior publication 
of the findings.'" Expert affidavits will be disregarded if unsupported by internal 
reference to or extrinsic support in any "medical literature, scientific publications, or 
personal experience" of the affiant.I4' An expert's inability to identify medical liter- 
ature supporting his or her conclusion as to casuation not only may reflect an inad- 
equate basis for the opinion under Rule 703, but also may indicate that the expert 
is not qualified to render it.I4' 
144. Id. at 748. 
145. Richardson v.  Richardson-Merrell. Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988). rert. denied, 110 S .  
Ct. 218 (1989); Lynch v. Merrell-Nat'l Labs., 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987). 
146. E.g., Richardson v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988). rert. 
denied, 110 S .  Ct. 218 (1989). 
147. Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Kan. 1990). 
148. E.g., id. 
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